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W.P. Bundy/bree 20 October 1962

Possible Soviet Courses of Action against Overseas Bases and their

Vulnerability to Such Actions

i. Introduction

The Seviets are probably playing their cards on Cuba for lavarage on two situations, Seriin and the oversees bases of the US and its key allies. (The two are not at all exclusive of each other or of other actives such as disreption of SAS and MATO, etc.) The purpose of this memorandum is to their lavarage base picture to see how the Soviet might play their hand, to what degree the different base situations are vulnerable to verious Soviet actions, and finally to see what we can do to counter these actions.

The Soviet lines of action fell roughly into three categories

- a. Sherefized regotiation aiming at either the total remova of overseds bases or a new set of ground rules that would talk the US out of selected bases.
- b. Attempts to egitate particular situations and/or get them singled out for re-depotiation, chiefly through pressures on local poblic opinion leading to action by the local government itself.
- Emponentially or serious attacks on specific bases, in response to may 95 military action against Cube.

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To get some kind of handle on the possibilities, it may be useful to set up Categories as to which some at least of the vulnerabilities or lines of defense are reaggly similar. These might be:

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<u>Category A:</u> tases on the territory of allies with freely elected covernments.

NATO

Non-MATO

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Japan

Philippines

France

Liberia (mimor)

Common

Italy -

Turkey -

Denmark (Greenland)

Iceland

Category 8; mass on the territory of anti-Communist nations (mostly allied), where although the povernment may not be freely elected; both it and popular sentiment are generally fevorable to the bases.

Portugel (Azores)

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SC (limited nevel).

Pakistan (no offensive systems)

Kares (UN presence makes speciel case)

The land/Vietnem (I mited forces only, no offensive

Category Cf basis on the territory of non-aligned or politically insecure nations, where local or governmental sentiment may be or become

Morocco

Saudi Arabie (transit rights or

Libya

Trinided (minor nevel only)

Ethiopia (comunications only)

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Category D: bases dependent on ceded territory or military occu-

pation; with clear legal status but major chance of inflamed local sentime

Category E.

Category F: mejor bases of key a

F-1: coluntes

Singapore

Aleerie (Hers-el-Labir)

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as to missiles)

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Vietnes/Thelland (de facto no offensive syste

SIC (ditto, though this might change)

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iii. Relative vulneratility

A: To generalized regotiation. Category A and Category B countries would probably be prepared to stand up and assert their continued desire to have US bases as a matter of their free choice under their right of self-defense. This is true even of fortugal and Pakistan under a condition of Soviet pressure. The only real difference between A and B countries would be in the propagable field, where the absence of freely elected governments. In the B countries would be the Soviets a handle.

From the standpoint of ground rules, even Category I countries would resist a general rule that countries outshoothhave foreign powers with bases, it is at least equable that they would note in the UN against such a general rule, shoes in all such tasks there is sujor direct bane both from the bases and from the aid that is the guid are not, They would still be succeptible, however, to prissions for change the avenues as a matter of from choice rather than a general rule.

Another cheke is a general fall against a foreign allitary, presence is that the boviets and their possible frigness may need desire to extend such deserte presence, sat markly in hits dark perhaps in Algeria: (plectarizine effect of some 700-mile playing the speral). Thus the Soviet attentions are seen of each to feet but down to an attempt to get errale that notions are a engicled to seek external aid some a foreign military presence, but that they are not seek external aid some a foreign entire foreign mation that the Tyber my relation to its own defence needs. This would point the flags of foreign action to its own defence needs. This would point the flags of foreign action to its own defence needs. This would point the flags of foreign the foreign the first part of the flags, fakisten, and Saudi Arabia on the ground that the facilities there that a requably — no such relation; while the Soviets

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would'se fairly immune to pressure. However, the alsing of the whole be issue would be likely to have an affect on those nations that are tempte to seek a greater guid pro quo (sid de political support) then they now have. Such possible anta-relears might include Spein, Fortugal, and Paul skips.

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fact this seems o Hitely serly sove fa any syent.

In the Caregory & cases the objective sould be to persunds or scree the local povernment, via its opposition, to become us have right this as would work veries a lot from case of case. Porocco has a real-public opinion and it mightbe around smally benings lessen's present friendly.

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TRANSCRIPTION FOLLOWS

Possible Soviet Courses of Action against Overseas Bases and their Vulnerability to Such Actions

I. Introduction

The Soviets are probably playing their cards on Cuba for leverage on two situations, Berlin and the overseas bases of the US and its key allies. (The two are not at all exclusive of each other or of other motives such as disruption of OAS and NATO, etc.) The purpose of this memorandum is to analyze the overseas base picture to see how the Soviets might play their hand, to what degree the different base situations are vulnerable to various Soviet actions, and finally to see what we can do to counter these actions.

The Soviet lines of action fall roughly into these categories:

- Generalized negotiation aiming at either the total removal of overseas bases or a new set of ground rules that would take the US out of selected bases.
- Attempts to agitate particular situations and/or get them singled out for re-negotiation, chiefly through pressures on local public opinion leading to action by the local government itself.
- Demonstrative or serious attacks on specific bases, in response to any US military action against Cuba.

II. Useful Base Categories

To get some kind of handle on the possibilities, it may be useful to set up Categories as to which some at least of the vulnerabilities or lines of defense are roughly similar. These might be:

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<u>Category A</u>: bases on the territory of allies with freely elected governments.

NATO	Non-NATO
UK Canada France Germany	Japan Philippines Liberia (minor)

Italy Turkey Denmark (Greenland) Iceland

<u>Category B</u>: bases on the territory of anti-Communist nations (mostly allied), where although the government may not be freely elected, both it and popular sentiment are generally favorable to the bases.

Portugal (Azores) [handwritten:] Timor problem Spain [illegible]RC (limited naval) Pakistan (no offensive systems) Korea (UN presence makes special case)

Thailand/Vietnam (limited forces only, no offensive systems)

<u>Category C</u>: bases on the territory of non-aligned or politically insecure nations, where local or governmental sentiment may be or become doubtful.

Morocco Saudi Arabia (transit rights only)
Libya Trinidad (minor naval only)
Ethiopia (communications only)

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<u>Category D</u>: bases dependent on ceded territory or military occupation, with clear legal status but major chance of inflamed local sentiment.

Panama Okinawa

Category E:

Guantanamo

Category F: major bases of key allies

F-1: colonies

Aden Hong Kong Gibraltar

F-2: former colonies with residual rights

Singapore Kenya Cyprus Algeria (Mers-el-Kabir) Malta (as good as abandoned)

Category G: significant exclusions or limitations

Berlin (garrison forces only, as offensive systems)
Iran (treaty exclusion of forces, supplemented by declaration as to missiles)

Laos (no organized forces even prior to recent agreements) Vietnam/Thailand (<u>de facto</u> no offensive systems) [illegible]RC (ditto, though this might change)

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III. Relative Vulnerability

A. To generalized negotiation. Category A and Category B countries would probably be prepared to stand up and assert their continued desire to have US bases as a matter of their free choice under their right of self-defense. This is true even of Portugal and Pakistan under a condition of Soviet pressure. The only real difference between A and B countries would be in the propaganda field, where the absence of freely elected governments in the B countries would give the Soviets a handle.

From the Standpoint of ground rules, even Category C countries would resist a general rule that countries could not have foreign powers with bases. It is at least possible that they would vote in the UN against such a general rule, since in all such cases there is major direct benefit both from the bases and from the aid, that is the <u>quid pro quo</u>. They would still be susceptible, however, to pressure for change and even removal as a matter of free choice rather than a general rule.

Another obstacle to a general rule against a foreign military presence is that the Soviets and their possible friends may well desire to extend such a Soviet presence, not merely to Cuba but perhaps in Algeria (picture the effect of some 700-mile missiles there). Thus the Soviet attack against "overseas bases" might in fact boil down to an attempt to get a rule that nations are entitled to seek external aid and a foreign military presence, but that they are not entitled to maintain facilities for a foreign nation that clearly bear no relation to its own defense needs. This would point the finger at Morocco, Libya, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia on the ground that the facilities there had – arguably—no such relation, while the Soviets

page 5 [mostly illegible]

would contend that [illegible] was directly threatened by the [illegible] and similar arguments about the present situation in the [illegible] as well as such prospective situations as Algeria. Such a Soviet [illegible] would leave the NATO structure untouched—but then the Soviets would figure they could not gain much there anyway.

[Paragraph excised]

From the standpoint of generalized attack, Category D (Panama and Okinawa) are in much the same boat as the British colonies; for both the attack would be a generalized "anti-colonial" [illegible] cannot be reached by generalized arguments about what [illegible] military presence is legitimate since they are not under fillegible] acreements.

Category G, finally, suggests A possible US counter-line of some effectiveness—this would be that any nation is entitled to a foreign military presence as it may desire, that [illegible] the judge of what is needed for its own defense... [illegible]... certain areas are of [illegible] in relation [illegible] that as a matter of international understanding they may not be [illegible] the site of installations of an offensive character [illegible] Iran (historically neutralized since 1921 and specifically [illegible] by the Iranian declaration to which the US [illegible]...like Berlin itself, as to which we have never [illegible] being in offensive systems and have offered to make this a matter of binding

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[Excised] agreement. We could certainly use these two parallels without danger to our foreseeable strategic needs. Southeast Asia is tempting, but any self-denial there involves the risk that the Chinese may one day come up with shortrange missiles beamed at Saigon and Bangkok. But at least Laos is a safe additional parallel.

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B. To Specific Pressures against Popular Sentiment.

Again, it may safely be assumed that Category A and B countries would be fairly immune to pressure. However, the airing of the whole base issue would be likely to have an effect on those nations that are tempted to seek a greater quid pro quo (aid or political support) than they now have. Such possible anteraisers might include Spain, Portugal, and Pakistan.

The real targets, again, would be Category C and Category D countries. As a special case [excised] in fact this seems a likely early move in any event.

In the Category C cases the objective would be to persuade or scare the local government, via its opposition, to abrogate US base rights. How this would work varies a lot from case to case. Morocco has a real public opinion and it might be aroused easily against Hassan's present friendly [excised] attitude toward extensions. Libya is probably less vulnerable, though it might be reached via UAR support for the Soviet position as both on general grounds and to get rid

of the British in Aden and Cyprus; after Suez, the UAR would probably lead any hue and cry against bases. Ethiopia would probably stand firm, since (as in Libya) our HAF makes a lot of difference; however, both countries have outstanding Soviet offers that might [illegible] well be renewed as part of the over all Soviet strategy. Saudi Arabia probably would neither persuade nor scare much, nor do our Dhahran remaining rights make too much difference. Trinidad is playing its own game, chiefly for economic aid, and might go either way, but again the facility is not a vital one.

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In sum, Morocco and Libya look like the trouble spots. The latter would be substantially more serious, since the communications facilities in Morocco can be replaced, though only with time and cost, while the air bases were planned to revert to maintenance only after 1963 anyway. (The intervening period would be a nuisance at best, and perhaps worse, with some real loss to our striking posture).

As to Category D, Panama might well have a double-edged reaction, and its fear of the Soviet missiles could be played on to probably good effect. Okinawa could be much more serious, because of the already great hostile sentiment both there and in Japan. Certainly the Soviets would pull out all the stops. It cannot be ruled out that they would even have a demonstrative attack on it to further inflame sentiment. Its absolutely key importance to the whole defense of the Far East should make it the central target of this kind of offensive.

C. To military attacks

Turkey has the Jupiter base that might be attacked by either conventional or nuclear weapons. The latter would be risky, but the former might be a fairly low-risk counter to any US attack on the Soviet bases in Cuba. Such an attack would not drive Turkey out of NATO, even if we did not take further action, but it could have a fairly demoralizing effect on the Turks over some time to come, and would serve as a useful example from the Soviet standpoint.

Dhahran is too small a target in importance to shoot for, and any attack on Libya might [text obscured] in the Arab World the Soviets would think it unwise. The same for Morocco, and either would have to

page 9

be hit by missiles to avoid the strong chance of warning.

Elsewhere in the Middle East and Europe it is hard to see any attack possibilities that would offer reward without major risk.

In the Far East, Okinawa might be tempting, and the effect could be quite serious on the sensitive Japanese fear nerve. However, it would be hard to do effectively. At least a demonstration against the offshore islands would probably be a CHICON contribution. In light of evidence of some CHICOM knowledge of Soviet plans. Hong Kong deserves mention, although the factors against attack [illegible] as strong as before.